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ABSTRACT 
 Selecting the appropriate venue for a criminal trial has been 
a matter of constitutional concern since the founding of the 
country. The issue is thought to be essential to the fair 
administration of justice and thus public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. Constitutionally, crimes must be 
prosecuted in the states and districts in which they were 
committed. However, the rise of cybercrime has complicated the 
venue inquiry: cyberspace, the domain of cybercrime, and 
physical space have become increasingly decoupled. 
Consequently, under America’s primary but dated cybercrime 
law, the ideal location for a trial may not be a constitutionally 
proper venue. This Note explores several possible approaches to 
permitting cybercrime trials to take place in the locations where 
they belong, including through an old but recently revisited 
judicially-created test for venue and through possible legislative 
reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Andrew Auernheimer is a hacker and self-proclaimed Internet 
“troll,”1 as well as a notorious “neo-Nazi white supremacist.”2 Over the 
years, Auernheimer has claimed a lengthy list of cyber-exploits.3 In one 
of his most infamous, he and a co-conspirator discovered a vulnerability 
in AT&T’s customer login system,4 which they programmatically 
exploited to harvest the email addresses of 114,000 AT&T customers.5 
Consequently, on March 18, 2013,6 he was convicted of violating the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act7—the primary federal statute used to 
prosecute computer hacking8—and sentenced to 41 months in prison.9 
Following his release from prison, Auernheimer publicly declared 
                                                
1 See Tom McCarthy, Andrew Auernheimer’s Conviction over Computer Fraud 
Thrown Out, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2014, 1:18 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/apr/11/andrew-auernheimers-
weev-conviction-vacated-hacking (“Auernheimer, a self-described internet troll 
and hacker, was found guilty in November 2012 conspiracy to gain unauthorised 
access to AT&T public servers, after he obtained thousands of email addresses 
of iPad owners.”). 
2 Andrew “Weev” Auernheimer, S. POVERTY L. CTR., 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/andrew-
%E2%80%9Cweev%E2%80%9D-auernheimer. 
3 See Adrian Chen, The Internet’s Best Terrible Person Goes to Jail: Can a 
Reviled Master Troll Become a Geek Hero?, GAWKER (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:05 
AM), http://gawker.com/5962159/the-internets-best-terrible-person-goes-to-jail-
can-a-reviled-master-troll-become-a-geek-hero (“He was the star of a 
blockbuster 2008 New York Times magazine profile about internet trolling, the 
art of provoking online for provocation’s sake. ‘I hack, I ruin lives, I make piles 
of money,’ he boasted in the Times. He’s also taken credit for attacks on 
Livejournal and Amazon, shocked audiences on live Australian television, and 
served as the president of an internet trolling organization whose very name the 
government prosecutor in charge of his case would not pronounce.”). 
4 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 530 (3d Cir. 2014). 
5 Id. at 531. 
6 Kim Zetter, AT&T Hacker ‘Weev’ Sentenced to 3.5 Years in Prison, WIRED 
(Mar. 18, 2013, 11:57 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/03/att-hacker-gets-3-
years/. 
7 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
8 See Elkin Girgenti, Computer Crimes, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 911, 921 (2018) 
(“The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (‘CFAA’) is the primary federal statute 
used to prosecute the unauthorized access and use of computers and computer 
networks.”). 
9 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 532. 
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himself a neo-Nazi, although he conceded that he had long been a “critic 
of Judaism.”10 He is also Jewish.11  
 On April 11, 2014, approximately 13 months into his sentence, 
the Third Circuit vacated Auernheimer’s conviction.12 The court 
determined “that venue did not lie in New Jersey,” where he was tried 
and convicted.13 Although Auernheimer obtained and disclosed the email 
addresses of thousands of New Jersey residents, “neither he nor [his co-
conspirator] was ever in New Jersey while allegedly committing the 
crime,” and “the servers accessed were not in New Jersey.”14  
I. VENUE GENERALLY 
 The Auernheimer case exemplifies a recurring issue in 
cybercrime prosecutions.15 Venue is the place where a defendant may 
stand trial, and it properly lies where the crime was committed.16 “But, in 
today’s wired world of telecommunication and technology, it is often 
difficult to determine exactly where a crime was committed, since 
different elements may be widely scattered in both time and space, and 
those elements may not coincide with the accused's actual presence.”17 In 
the age of the Internet, a cybercriminal, his target computer, and his 
actual, human victims—those who genuinely experience the harm of his 
actions—are often located in different, distant states, thus obscuring the 
location where the crime was committed and complicating the venue 
inquiry. This Note examines the approaches that federal courts have 
taken to resolve this issue, including the prevailing approach of, in effect, 
                                                
10 Andrew Auernheimer, What I Learned from My Time in Prison, DAILY 
STORMER (Oct. 1, 2014), https://dailystormer.name/what-i-learned-from-my-
time-in-prison/.  
11 Michael Edison Hayden, Neo-Nazi Who Calls for ‘Slaughter’ of Jewish 
Children Is of Jewish Descent, His Mom Says, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 3, 2018, 6:25 
AM), https://www.newsweek.com/neo-nazi-andrew-weev-auernheimer-daily-
stormer-jewish-descent-768805. 
12 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 529. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 531. 
15 See generally OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING 
COMPUTER CRIMES 116–20 (2d ed. 2015) [hereinafter PROSECUTING COMPUTER 
CRIMES], available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf (describing the issues and ambiguities of 
venue in cybercrime prosecutions). 
16 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where 
the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”). 
17 United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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not resolving it at all. Until cybercrime venue is more properly specified, 
either by the courts or by statute, it will remain a source of ambiguity in 
the prosecution of cybercrimes and a convenient option for defendants to 
challenge the charges against them without addressing the merits of their 
cases and conduct. 
A. Constitutional Basis 
 In criminal proceedings, a defendant’s venue right arises from 
two clauses of the Constitution.18 First, the Constitution specifies that 
“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said 
Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”19 Second, the Vicinage Clause 
guarantees the accused in all criminal prosecutions the right to trial “by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed.”20 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure echo the 
constitutional commands, requiring prosecution “in a district where the 
offense was committed.”21 Notably, however, “when [the offense is] not 
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as 
the Congress may by Law have directed.”22 
 The Constitution’s venue provisions were introduced as a 
reaction to Great Britain’s efforts to transport colonists “beyond Seas to 
be tried.”23 The earliest concerns emerged in 1769, after the House of 
Commons recommended trial in England for treason in the 
Massachusetts Bay colony.24 The issue reemerged in 1772 after 
Parliament enacted a statute allowing for trial of certain offenses in 
England.25 Although these fears were never truly realized, they prompted 
the creation of both clauses.26 
                                                
18 See, e.g., United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998) (“The Constitution 
twice safeguards the defendant’s venue right . . . .”). 
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
21 FED. R. CRIM. P. 18; see also Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 18) (“Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing that 
‘prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed,’ 
echoes the constitutional commands.”). 
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
23 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 21 (U.S. 1776). 
24 Paul Mogin, “Fundamental Since Our Country’s Founding”: United States v. 
Auernheimer and the Sixth Amendment Right to Be Tried in the District in 
Which the Alleged Crime Was Committed, 6 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 37, 40–41 
(2016). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 42. 
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B. The Basic Venue Inquiry 
 To determine where venue is proper, courts look to the “locus 
delicti” of the offense—the place where the crime was committed.27 
When Congress has not indicated such a place in the statute, “the locus 
delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the 
location of the act or acts constituting it.”28 This is a two-step inquiry. 
First, a court identifies “the conduct constituting the offense (the nature 
of the crime)” by identifying each “essential conduct element” of the 
offense.29 Second, the court discerns “the location of the commission of 
the criminal acts.”30 Venue may lie wherever any essential conduct 
element was carried out.31 Venue must be proper as to each count; the 
propriety of venue for one charge does not by itself confer proper venue 
upon the other charges.32 
C. Venue in Auernheimer 
 The charges against Auernheimer were questionable in several 
respects.33 As Auernheimer’s lawyers argued, to obtain the email 
addresses, Auernheimer merely accessed an unprotected, public 
website.34 His conduct, while perhaps undesirable, was not obviously 
                                                
27 See United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946) (“Since the statute 
does not indicate where Congress considered the place of committing the crime 
to be, the locus delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged 
and the location of the act or acts constituting it.” (citation omitted)); see also 
Locus Delicti, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “locus 
delicti” as the “place where an offense was committed”). 
28 Anderson, 328 U.S. at 703 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97–
98 (1922)). 
29 United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1999). 
30 Id. at 279. 
31 See id. at 281–82 (“[W]here a crime consists of distinct parts which have 
different localities the whole may be tried where any part can be proved to have 
been done.” (quoting United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 77 (1916))). 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. 871 F.2d 1181, 1188 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 220–22 (2d Cir.1966) 
and United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)) (“[W]hen 
a defendant is charged in more than one count, venue must be proper with 
respect to each count.”). 
33 See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]his 
appeal raises a number of complex and novel issues that are of great public 
importance in our increasingly interconnected age.”). 
34 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 18–32, United States v. Auernheimer, 748 
F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1816), 2013 WL 3380740 (making this 
argument).  
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unauthorized, as required by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.35 
Likewise, as a policy matter, one might question whether compiling a 
collection of email addresses—characteristically public-facing addresses 
used by people to communicate with one another—should be deservedly 
punished by a multiyear prison sentence.36  
 Regardless of one’s general feelings toward Auernheimer and his 
case, cybercrime cases like his call into question the traditional 
constitutional inquiry and rationale for venue. As the Third Circuit has 
itself previously observed, “the [Supreme] Court has consistently viewed 
the venue provisions of the Constitution as important safeguards 
protecting an accused from unfairness and hardship in defending against 
prosecution by the federal government.”37  
 The Internet is an inherently nationwide, indeed worldwide, 
technology and practically everyone knows it—certainly someone like 
Auernheimer with “thirteen years of experience in networking” ought 
to.38 Consequently, when a criminal concocts a scheme that harms 
victims “throughout the country,” the criminal “can hardly complain that 
their very modus operandi subject[s] them to prosecution in numerous 
districts.”39  
 In light of this feature of the Internet, under the traditional 
inquiry, venue for cybercrime prosecutions may often be appropriate in 
seemingly arbitrary and unanticipated locations anyway, depending on 
the charges. The cybercriminal’s target computer may be located in an 
                                                
35 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (requiring the defendant access a computer 
“without authorization” or in excess of “authorized access”). 
36 There are certainly cases where one may be harmed by exposure on the 
membership, customer, or user list of a particular group. See, e.g., Seattle Times 
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1984) (preventing the Seattle Times from 
publishing a list of donors to a fringe religious group that was produced in 
pretrial discovery); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 
(1958) (holding that freedom of association prevented Alabama from 
subpoenaing the NAACP’s membership list); Tom Lamont, Life After the Ashley 
Madison Affair, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2016, 7:05 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/28/what-happened-after-
ashley-madison-was-hacked (describing the aftermath of the leaking of an 
infidelity-promoting website’s user list, including resignations, divorces, and 
suicides). As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely that such a harm could 
result from being exposed as an AT&T customer. It is also unclear whether, 
even in some of the more egregious cases, federal felony charges are just.  
37 United States v. Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 (3d Cir. 1980). 
38 Auernheimer, supra note 10. 
39 See United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 895 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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unknown, distant, and ultimately surprising location,40 yet venue may 
very well be appropriate there.41 And it seems unlikely that a 
cybercriminal would carefully investigate the geographic location of that 
computer to determine whether it would be a suitable venue for his 
eventual prosecution.42 It seems even more unlikely that a cybercriminal 
would consider the suitability of each district through which his digital 
signals may pass on their way to his target computer—even though he 
could conceivably be prosecuted for, for example, wire fraud in each 
district.43 In the age of cloud computing, the physical location of 
software and websites is frequently mutable and diffuse.44 It is unclear 
how selecting these locations as constitutionally proper venues is fairer 
for or imposes less hardship on defendants—nevertheless, they are so 
selected anyway.  
 In Auernheimer’s case, the government sensibly tried to 
establish venue based on the location of his victims.45 A cybercrime 
defendant may actually be more familiar with the location of his victims 
                                                
40 Ingrid Burrington, Why Amazon’s Data Centers Are Hidden in Spy Country, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/amazon-web-services-
data-center/423147/ (describing the difficulties of locating Amazon’s cloud 
computing data centers). 
41 See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(suggesting that venue was not appropriate because “the servers accessed were 
not in” the district). 
42 The foreseeability of “some form of legal proceedings” in the venue is an 
aspect of whether venue is constitutionally fair. See United States v. Miller, 808 
F.3d 607, 622 (2d Cir. 2015) (“These observations also suggest that the strong 
interest in the dispute maintained by [the venue], as the home of [the victim] and 
the courts vested with relevant authority, and the possibility of some form of 
legal proceedings there, were foreseeable to [the defendant].”). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 349–50 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Therefore, venue is established in those locations where the wire transmission 
at issue originated, passed through, or was received, or from which it was 
‘orchestrated.’”). 
44 See Where Your Data is Located, MICROSOFT: TRUST CTR., 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/trustcenter/privacy/data-management/data-
location (then click on the drop-down bar entitled “Data storage and transfers”) 
(“Customer data may be replicated within a selected geographic area for 
enhanced data durability in case of a major datacenter disaster, and in some 
cases, will not be replicated outside it.”) (last visited Oct. 21, 2018); Amazon 
EC2, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ (last visited Oct. 21, 
2018); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
45 See Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 536. 
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than the location of the computers that happen to be running the software 
through which he victimizes them.46  
 Moreover, with the development of modern transportation and 
communication technologies, in cases where much of the evidence will 
be digital and thus readily available anywhere in the world,47 the 
hardship imposed on cybercrime defendants has only further shrunk. 
And, naturally, the venue where the victims are located will have a 
significant interest in addressing the crime.  
II. VENUE BASED ON EFFECTS 
 In the Auernheimer case, the government argued that venue 
ought to be proper where the effects of a crime are felt.48 If venue could 
so lie, then venue would have been proper in New Jersey, where 
Auernheimer was tried—thousands of those whose information he 
exposed were located there.49 The Third Circuit declined to follow this 
approach,50 but the government’s efforts were not meritless. The Second 
Circuit long ago developed a substantial contacts test for determining the 
permissibility of venue, of which the location of the effects of the crime 
is one of four factors.51 The test has had arguably greater influence in the 
                                                
46 Although not so in Auernheimer, the victims of cybercrimes are frequently 
major corporations. Many, especially in the technology industry, are aware that, 
for example, Microsoft is located in Redmond, Washington. See CITY OF 
REDMOND, REDMOND TRAVEL DIARY SURVEY (2010), available at 
https://www.redmond.gov/common/pages/UserFile.aspx?fileId=70609 
(“Redmond is best known as the home of Microsoft (for which Redmond has 
become a metonym) . . . .”) (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
47 The Court has noted that the “hardship of defending prosecutions in places 
remote from home” arises at least in part from the “accused’s difficulties, 
financial and otherwise, of marshalling his witnesses.” United States v. Johnson, 
323 U.S. 273, 278 (1944) (citation omitted). 
48 See Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 536. 
49 See supra notes 13 and 14 and accompanying text. 
50 See Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 536 (“It is far from clear that this Court has ever 
‘adopted’ this test. We have mentioned it only once. . . . No panel of this Court 
has ever cited . . . this test since—either before, or especially after, the Supreme 
Court clarified the venue inquiry in Cabrales and Rodriguez–Moreno.”). 
51 See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Third, places 
that suffer the effects of a crime are entitled to consideration for venue purposes. 
Such districts have an obvious contact with the litigation in their interest in 
preventing such effects from occurring.”). 
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Sixth Circuit.52 And the Department of Justice cautiously suggests this as 
a potential option for federal prosecutors.53  
A. The Second Circuit’s Substantial Contacts Test 
 The first case to suggest that effects-based venue may be 
permissible was United States v. Reed.54 In Reed, the Second Circuit 
determined that the test for venue “is best described as a substantial 
contacts rule that takes into account a number of factors.”55 The court 
identified four factors in particular: “the site of the defendant’s acts, the 
elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal 
conduct, and the suitability of each district for accurate factfinding.”56 
The court first noted that “[v]irtually all the caselaw” supports venue 
based on the first factor—the site of the defendant’s acts.57 But the court 
described the remaining factors as “also important,” because they “often 
give sites other than where the acts occurred equal standing so far as 
venue is concerned.”58 
 According to Reed’s substantial contacts test, “places that suffer 
the effects of a crime are entitled to consideration for venue purposes” 
because they “have an obvious contact with the litigation in their interest 
in preventing such effects from occurring.”59 This language appears to 
suggest that merely causing an effect in a district may be sufficient to 
support venue there. 
 The Reed court provided two examples of this effects-based 
approach to setting venue: “Hobbs Act and Taft-Hartley criminal 
prosecutions may be brought in districts where interstate commerce is 
affected as well as where the acts took place.”60 The Hobbs Act, 
                                                
52 See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text (describing the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach that generally favors extending venue where there are substantial 
contacts). 
53 See PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 15, at 120 (“In some cases, 
venue might also lie in the district where the effects of the crime are felt. . . . 
Prosecutors seeking to establish venue by this method are encouraged to contact 
CCIPS at (202) 514-1026.”). 
54 Reed, 773 F.2d 477; see also Mogin, supra note 24, at 47 (“In United States v. 
Reed, the Second Circuit embraced a novel approach to determining where 
venue is proper under the Constitution.”). 
55 Reed, 773 F.2d at 481. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 482. 
60 Id. (citing United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1978) and 
United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 331–33 (4th Cir. 1982)).  
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however, defines its offense in terms of causing an effect.61 The Taft-
Hartley Act is less clearly defined in such terms.62 In the relevant case on 
the Taft-Hartley Act cited by the Reed court, the Fourth Circuit found 
venue proper in the Eastern District of Virginia after an illicit transaction 
in New York “affected” an area within the district.63 However, the Fourth 
Circuit also determined “that one element of a section 186(b) Taft-
Hartley offense is that the ‘giving’ must be proved to be to a 
representative of an employee of an industry affecting commerce”—
effectively reading an effects-based element into the statute.64 Thus, the 
“same venue rationale”—that where an element is defined in terms of 
affecting commerce, venue will lie wherever commerce is affected—
applied to the Tart-Hartley Act as to the Hobbs Act.65  
 The Second Circuit has “alternately applied and ignored the 
substantial contacts test” since deciding Reed.66 Moreover, even when 
applying Reed, the Second Circuit has frequently noted that Reed “does 
not represent a formal constitutional test” and is merely “helpful in 
determining whether a chosen venue is unfair or prejudicial to a 
defendant.”67 For example, when “all of the substantial contacts appear 
                                                
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (punishing, in relevant part, one who “affects 
commerce . . . by robbery or extortion”). 
62 Nowhere in the definition of the relevant criminal offense do the words 
“affects” or “effects” or any variants thereof appear. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) 
(2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or 
accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any 
money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a).”). Rather, when read 
in conjunction with § 186(a), the “any person” of § 186(b)(1) becomes a person 
“affecting commerce.” See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(1)–(4) (2012) (listing classes of 
prohibited recipients, all of whom must be “affecting commerce”). 
63 See Billups, 692 F.2d at 331–32.  
64 See id. at 333 (“Although worded differently, a sine qua non of a section 
186(b) violation is that the forbidden act affect commerce.”). 
65 Id. 
66 United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (comparing United 
States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 893 (2d Cir. 2008) and United States v. Saavedra, 
223 F.3d 85, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2000), both approvingly citing Reed, with United 
States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2011), which questioned the latter 
three factors of the substantial contacts test). 
67 Saavedra, 223 F.3d at 93; see also United States v. Kirk Tang Yuk, 885 F.3d 
57, 70 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We have acknowledged that this is not a ‘formal 
constitutional test,’ but have nevertheless found it to be a valuable safeguard for 
a defendant whose contacts with the district of prosecution are minimal.” 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Rutigliano, 790 F.3d 389, 399 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“[The substantial contacts] inquiry is made only if ‘the defendant argues 
that his prosecution in the contested district will result in a hardship to him, 
 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 156 
to be in Illinois,” a court may have “serious doubts that venue lies in the 
Southern District of New York.”68 Thus, the substantial contacts test may 
function more as a potential limit on venue, rather than an option for 
extending venue to other districts. 
B. Substantial Contacts in Other Circuits 
 The Sixth Circuit adopted the substantial contacts test in 1986, 
less than a year after United States v. Reed was decided.69 Where “[o]ther 
circuits have used the substantial contacts test to ensure that venue is 
constitutionally adequate,” the Sixth Circuit has “applied the substantial 
contacts test to determine which districts qualify as venues.”70 The Sixth 
Circuit has found, for example, that “two factors—the elements of the 
crime and the locus of its effects—can outweigh the location of 
Defendant’s acts and satisfy the substantial contacts test.”71 The Sixth 
Circuit has also stated that venue is proper when only the locus-of-effects 
and the most-suitable-for-fact-finding factors are satisfied.72 
 The Fourth Circuit once cited the substantial contacts test with 
approval,73 and indeed the Second Circuit relied on a Fourth Circuit 
opinion in crafting the locus-of-effects factor of the Reed test.74 The 
Fourth Circuit later backed away from this approach, however, claiming 
that the reasoning for the approach was irreconcilable with later Supreme 
Court precedent.75 Interestingly, in the most recent Supreme Court case 
                                                                                                         
prejudice him, or undermine the fairness of his trial.’” (quoting Coplan, 703 
F.3d at 80)); United States v. Abdallah, 528 F. App’x 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(describing the substantial contacts factors as “useful guideposts,” but “not 
mandatory . . . for a valid venue”). 
68 United States v. Alvarez, No. S3 11 CR 169(VB), 2012 WL 4794442, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2012). The defendant in the cited case was ultimately 
convicted. See United States v. Alvarez, 601 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2337 (2015) (affirming Alvarez’s convictions). 
69 See United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986) (“We now 
adopt the substantial contacts test as well as the rationale and framework of 
analysis articulated by the Reed court.”). 
70 United States v. Castaneda, 315 F. App’x 564, 569 (6th Cir. 2009). 
71 Id. 
72 See United States v. Brika, 416 F.3d 514, 528 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Venue was 
proper in the Southern District of Ohio under both 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and the 
substantial contacts test.”). 
73 See United States v. Cofield, 11 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1993). 
74 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
75 See United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Our 
reasoning in Cofield, however, cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s 
later decisions in Cabrales and Rodriguez–Moreno.”). 
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that the Fourth Circuit cited as irreconcilable, the Court explicitly left 
open the possibility of an effects-based approach to setting venue.76 
 The Tenth Circuit has explicitly rejected the substantial contacts 
test.77 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have indicated some approval 
for the test.78 The remaining circuits have yet to seriously consider the 
issue. 
C. Auernheimer under the Substantial Contacts Test 
 In the Auernheimer case, the government argued that the Third 
Circuit had adopted the substantial contacts test in a previous case.79 The 
Third Circuit sharply criticized this claim, but eventually admitted that 
the court had “perhaps tacitly endorsed [the substantial contacts] test 
once almost thirty years ago.”80 The court determined, however, that 
even under the substantial contacts test, venue would have been 
inappropriate in New Jersey because “the test operates to limit venue, not 
to expand it.”81 Moreover, the government had only “minimally satisfied 
one of the four prongs of the test,” and the “locus of effects, standing by 
itself,” is not sufficient to confer venue.82 The Third Circuit further 
suggested that the possibility left open by the Supreme Court as to 
effects-based venue83 referred only to statutes where “an essential 
conduct element is defined in terms of its effect.”84  
                                                
76 See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 n.2 (1999) (“The 
Government argues that venue also may permissibly be based upon the effects 
of a defendant’s conduct in a district other than the one in which the defendant 
performs the acts constituting the offense. Because this case only concerns the 
locus delicti, we express no opinion as to whether the Government’s assertion is 
correct.” (citation omitted)). 
77 See United States v. Smith, 641 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We 
decline to adopt this ‘substantial contacts’ test.”). 
78 See United States v. Muhammad, 502 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying 
on the “admonition” of the substantial contacts test); United States v. Muench, 
153 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The place that suffers the effects of a 
crime deserves consideration for venue purposes.”). 
79 See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 536 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The 
Government argues that . . . we have ‘adopted’ a ‘substantial contacts test.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 537. 
83 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
84 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 537 (quoting United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 
302, 311 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
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 The Third Circuit’s conclusion about the application of the 
substantial contacts test is likely correct under Second Circuit precedent. 
Despite the Second Circuit’s initial articulation of the test, the Second 
Circuit has primarily used it as an additional constraint to ensure the 
fairness of venue.85 However, under the Sixth Circuit approach to the 
substantial contacts test—where fewer factors86 must be satisfied and the 
substantial contacts test is used more readily as a means of extending the 
reach of venue87—this conclusion may be incorrect. 
III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
 Several circuits have held that effects-based venue is 
unconstitutional, outside of a few circumstances directed by statute.88 
Nevertheless, as there are legitimate policy reasons to provide for 
effects-based venue in cybercrime cases, existing cybercrime statutes 
should be modified accordingly.   
A. Redefining the Offense 
 When causing an effect is an essential conduct element of a 
crime, the crime may be prosecuted wherever the effect was caused.89 
Thus, by defining the cybercrimes in terms of the effects they cause on 
victims, venue would be appropriate in the location or locations of those 
victims. 
 Portions of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act are already 
defined in terms of effects, but these provisions have unfortunate 
drawbacks compared to those that are not already defined in such terms. 
                                                
85 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing how the Second Circuit 
has come to apply the substantial contacts test primarily as a limit on venue, 
rather than a tool for expanding its reach). 
86 Notably, the Sixth Circuit has suggested that only the latter two elements may 
be necessary. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The third element, the 
locus of effects, was clearly satisfied, with thousands of victims in New Jersey. 
The fourth element, the availability of evidence, may also have been arguably 
satisfied, to the extent that the evidence was electronic. See supra Part I.B. 
87 See supra notes 70 and 72 and accompanying text (arguing that the Sixth 
Circuit may use the substantial contacts test to extend venue to districts where 
other circuits would not). 
88 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
89 See Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 537 (“Undoubtedly there are some instances 
where the location in which a crime's effects are felt is relevant to determining 
whether venue is proper. But those cases are reserved for situations in which ‘an 
essential conduct element is itself defined in terms of its effects.’” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Bowens, 224 F.3d at 311)); see also United States v. Davis, 
689 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bowens for the same proposition). 
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For example, as the Third Circuit observed in the Auernheimer case, 
“[18 U.S.C.] § 1030(a)(5)(B) criminalizes intentionally accessing a 
computer without authorization and recklessly causing damage.”90 But in 
addition to being more generally complicated than, for example, the 
offense Auernheimer was charged with,91 this provision is much 
narrower than its plain text might suggest. “Damage” is limited to 
“impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, 
or information.”92 Moreover, because damage does not include a more 
generalized sort of harm to human victims, but rather is limited to 
damage to information systems, the venue inquiry would likely center on 
the location of the computer, not its owner or those who are actually 
harmed by the cybercrime. 
 Despite the limitations of § 1030(a)(5)(B) discussed above, its 
basic form may be instructive. Computers are unfeeling inanimate 
objects, despite occasional appearances to the contrary. The victims of 
cybercrimes are the people who are harmed by them, both those who 
own the computers and those who own the stolen information residing on 
the computers. It would be a simple revision to extend “causing damage” 
to include “causing harm to people.”  
 Nevertheless, because even those offenses that appear to be 
defined in terms of effects may need to be reevaluated, this approach to 
law reform may be inefficient and increase the burden of proof for the 
government. Revising every relevant offense may be needlessly time-
consuming. More critically, the government may be forced to prove 
specific intent to injure people, rather than mere intent to access the 
computer system. 
B. Specific Venue Provisions 
 Another, perhaps more convenient, option would be to add a 
statutory provision that specifies the proper location of venue.93 This 
would effectively remove all doubt as to “where Congress considered the 
place of committing the crime to be.”94 For example, one of the main 
federal obstruction of justice statutes, which proscribes obstructing 
official proceedings, allows prosecution to “be brought in the district in 
                                                
90 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 537; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (2012). 
91 Which only involves unauthorizedly obtaining information from a computer. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
92 Id. § 1030(e)(8). 
93 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22361, VENUE: A BRIEF 
LOOK AT FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING WHERE A FEDERAL CRIME MAY BE TRIED 
3 (2018) (listing crimes with individual venue provisions). 
94 United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946). 
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which the official proceeding . . . was intended to be affected,” as well as 
“in the district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense 
occurred.”95 An analogous cybercrime venue provision might specify 
that prosecutions under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act may be 
brought in the district in which at least some of the victims of the offense 
were located.  
 Specific venue provisions must fall within constitutional limits.96 
Fortunately, there is little doubt that a specific venue provision here 
would. In the obstruction of justice venue provision, the official 
proceeding need not be “pending” or even “about to be instituted.”97 To 
be prosecuted for obstructing an official proceeding, the defendant need 
not even have knowledge about the potential official proceeding.98 Thus 
the mere fact that the particular real, human victims of one’s cybercrime 
may be unknown to the defendant should not pose an obstacle. 
CONCLUSION 
 When a crime is committed in cyberspace, identifying the 
physical place where it was committed is often challenging, even 
nonsensical. With traditional crimes, the criminal, the victim, and the 
scene of the crime are not strewn across the world—not so with 
cybercrimes. The traditional criminal venue inquiry, centering on the 
geographic scene of the crime, is thus ill-suited to cybercrimes. The 
                                                
95 18 U.S.C. § 1512(i) (2012). 
96 See United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 164 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Travis 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 635 (1961) and Armour Packing Co. v. United 
States, 209 U.S. 56, 73–75 (1908)) (“If the statute under which the defendant is 
charged contains a specific venue provision, that provision must be honored 
(assuming, of course, that it satisfies the constitutional minima).”). However, 
these constitutional limits on congressional definition of offenses are unclear. 
See United States v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The outer limits 
on how broadly Congress may define a continuing offense and thereby create 
multiple venues is unclear.”).  
97 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (2012). 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361, 1369 (8th Cir. 1986) (“Proof 
of a violation of § 1503 requires proof of the defendant’s knowledge of a 
pending judicial proceeding, which is expressly not an element of a violation of 
§ 1512.”). However, more recent cases have required a tighter “nexus element” 
between the proceeding and the obstructive conduct. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707–08 (2005) (requiring that a proceeding 
be “foreseen”). The source of this requirement is unclear. See United States v. 
Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 612 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“The Court does not indicate where its ‘nexus’ requirement is to be 
found within the words of the statute. Instead, it justifies its holding [by] . . . 
importing extratextual requirements . . . .”). 
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home venues of the victims of such crimes only occasionally prove 
suitable. The judicially-developed substantial contacts test, which allows 
for the consideration of where the effects of a crime are felt in setting 
venue, could offer a promising solution, but it has not been widely 
adopted. Congress, however, could offer an ultimate solution by updating 
the cybercrime statutes to provide for venue in the place where the actual 
victims of a cybercrime experience its harm. 
